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Become a fan of Slashdot on Facebook. Last ones you needed 3D to really get into them, few have 3D sets. I have 3D and bored fast with my selections. As indicated in the article, this is probably due to malware. The list of sites affected is large while the number of released account details is small.

Malware usually doesn't even need to keylog anymore, it can just fetch passwords from the browser Porn site password search store. With this in mind, changing your password now will Porn site password search not have a major effect unless you are on the list.

Since most people don't have the malware, and those that do En harakaetli seks pornoleri probably still have it when they update their account. Just wait a bi. Haha, nice try Pokemon hot naked girl, but you're not tricking me into giving you more time to mess with my porn accounts.

Interesting that you mentally link porn accounts with disgusting. Porn site password search one wonder just what kind of porn you're into.

It could have been a small subset of a larger leak. Perhaps 13, out of millions Porn site password search just happen to have the same seed values so they could be cracked easier. Of course then someone would have had to try those 13, against some of the top web sites in the world but Porn site password search should have left their fingerprints in logs all over the world. Most of the listed sites have far more than 13, registered users, so access to the member database of just ONE of the sites would have yielded a much larger dump.

Also, some of the sites store Porn site password search a properly salted, modern hash of the password, so there's almost no way to get passwords from the sites' servers. It's pretty clear the hack is in the client side.

We may have a look to see of the logs go back far enough to tell us which browser version, OS, and toolbars or addons those members were using. The list of sites alone is clear enough on that, even if you know nothing about them. Someone Mallu actresses nude photos had a little lolz with the botnet he owns anyways. TFA advise Porn site password search totally bogus: They don't post the list of Porn site password search to advise people to check their accounts, they do it because it's their excuse for posting a list of x-rated stuff on a non-x-rated site.

Pure sensationalism. Or which desktop dancing nude woman they installed, or old version of flash player they use, or any other of a thousand possible problems. What you want for password storage is confidence that if the bad Porn site password search gets F plaintext,saltthe hash they can't derive the plaintext.

It's a one-way trap door - you can compute the hash from the plaintext password, but not the other way around. You do not care about any aspects of the output, other than that it can't be used to infer the input and Porn site password search it has a guaranteed reasonable maximum length.

For a key derivation function, it's ALL about the output. You're trying to create output that has particular attributes, such as pseudo- random bits, long length, and bonus points if they length can be extended to go on forever.

Key derivation algorithms sometimes work okay as hashes for password storagebut almost by accident. That's not what they're designed for. To achieve the very different goals of KDAs, they tend to be much more complex, and therefore much more likely to contain subtle undiscovered weaknesses. I'd rather use something designed for the job at hand.

If a student turned in a project that Porn site password search bcrypt for password storage, I wouldn't mark down their grade. It's just not my personal preference. As it happens, I'm trying to make a good KDA right now at work, for very specific interpretations of the word 'good'.

I may be done in a year or two. Er, not really? You want a well-optimized function to turn a password into a very big unpredictable number in a way that's computationally complex, and that's precisely what KDFs are made to do. The entire crux of your argument against such use seems to boil down to "but they sometimes let you specify how big a number you want", as if this added complexity and risk somehow massively outweighed that created by rolling your own slow crappy little alternative.

You want a well-optimized function to turn a password into a very big unpredictable number in a way that's computationally complex. You don't want it to be computationally complex. In fact you sometimes enforce O 1 time, you don't want a longer or different password to take longer to hash, because that facilitates timing attacks. You want the hash algorithm to be SLOW, not "well optimized" How do you make an algorithm that's slow without being computationally complex?

Writing it all in PHP doesn't count. The algorithm has to be slow because it's a lot of work. Your implementation has to be fast to maximise the security benefit of using it in the first place. Look up "computational complexity" sometime.

A computationally complex algorithm is one that gets much slower as the input gets longer. For small inputs, low-complexity algorithm can be, and probably will be much slower than a high a complexity algorithm. For password hashing, you want the very lowest possible complexity - constant time. Low complexity, constant time, doesn't mean fast; it means that the time and space required is the same for any legal input. If it's slow for all inputs, that's low co. Yes, I used "computationally complex" to mean "takes a lot of steps to complete".

You and your "words mean stuff", stop evading the point. Please use words which mean stuff. Rolling your own is stupid. I never said using a good KDF was worse than rolling your own algorithm of unknown quality and unknown behavior.

In fact, I said bcrypt specifically is acceptable, that I wouldn't take points off your grade for using bcrypt. A better choice is a properly vetted hash that's designed as a hash, such as SHA Using a KDF as a hash is like Porn site password search a butter knife as a screwdri.

Good work, you just Porn site password search most of PBKDF2, just without the peer review, sane defaults, and for most people, probably Porn site password search a language where the function call overhead exceeds the cost of the hashing. Using a KDF as a hash is like using a butter knife as a screwdriver - it gets the job done, and professionals normally Porn site password search the tool designed for the job rather than substituting.

Hashes are not designed for password storage, Milfy faty geetha actress the entire reason we're having this conversation in the first place. People use KDF's for password storage because that's what they're made for. Anyone who uses a plain old hash h. It's not being used as a key. Key stretching would be pointless.

You stretch to get a longer key if your goal is to derive a strong key - a Key Derivation Function. Password hashes aren't Porn site password search as xryptographic keys. They're stored, period. They say "when all you have is a hammer KDFs are for key derivation. That's why they're called key derivation functions.

How is that hard to understand. You stretch to get a longer key if your goal is to derive a strong key. You want a strong key! Key stretching isn't just about making a physically longer key, it's about making a stronger one, such as by iterating your hash function a million times.

This is not in question. What is Porn site password search question is why it's not exactly what you'd want out of a password hashing function - what difference does it make whether you're going to pass it to AES or to a comparison function?

I am aware of that. I Porn site password search took another quick glance, and noticed two things. There may be another, larger, issue I noticed last time and didn't notice this time. The two I noticed this time are language silliness, rather than security silliness. Redundant language bloat. PHP has more duplicate functions than C has functions in total. In Perl, C. You created a 10,X increase in the work factor for brute force attacks. If you had just hashed over the salt and password once, encrypted the result and kept the key private, you would have a increase in the work factor.

If you are going to do your own round counts, there are better ways to make it so you can't use hardware to attack your system. One trivial way with hashes is to xor the 1st byte with 0xaa on the 12th round. That alone means anyone building hardware or a GPU approach needs to take that odd step into account and that should about double the work needed by a GPU using today's techniques for optimisation.

Another thing that works is to use a different table. A simple swap of two bytes somewhere in the table means it is incompatible with off the shelf solutions and should be the same strength. There is a risk that doing this will cryptographically weaken the hash. For example if you use the XOR trick too early or too often in the rounds, you end up forcing bits to a known state and that makes it much weaker much like messing with S-boxes in DES does and for the same reasons.

Moving around values in large tables tends to be safe as does some conditional byte manipulation in later rounds assuming you are doing more than the standard count. A great way to find out what doesn't work is Porn site password search a md5 like function with 32 bits and just a few rounds.


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